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ABSTRACT
One would not think that thought experiments could matter to nature, for they
are a humble human device. Yet quantum mechanics very naturally frames
thought experiments (as distinct from precisely defining what exists). They
exemplify the informing powers of radiation. Though based on wave functions
that have time symmetry, these tableaus inevitably tell of irreversible behavior
by nature. The paper sketches how John von Neumann’s measurement theory
fits into this and retells N. David Mermin’s baseball story.
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1 A law both important and imperfect
How often the things we do have unintended consequences. Yet it could be
worse. Look at your dinner plate before you. Whether you eat the peas or
potatoes first might determine which hibiscus flower a bee visits in a far swale.
A walrus may live or die on your choice of fork to eat your salad. Such things
have not always seemed impossible.
2Belief in physics has made these things seem impossible; we scorn them
as magic now. When something material passes from fork to walrus, if only
a beam of light, then the walrus’s fate can depend on your choice of fork.
Otherwise, no.
Here a philosopher brings up an interesting point. Should you wish to eat
your dinner in peace, unconcerned that you might have an unplanned, fatal
effect on walruses, physics is a disconcertingly shaky thing to rely on. For
physical theories change. But there is no need to resort to sophistications.
Common experience suffices to teach us that we may sup untroubled.
All we need to do is gather statistics. If we watch often enough, to see which
fork is chosen and when walruses die, we will find that there is no correlation
between them. And that is all we can know. To go farther and suppose that
our choice of fork never kills a walrus is something so hopeless to back with
evidence that the idea is quite meaningless. For in any case one can think
that sometimes it may kill a walrus, and then it works out like this: If it does
happen, as often the choice saves a walrus as kills one. Things are balancing
out.
And we are not able to tell how it will go when we choose our fork, so there
is no change we can make in our behavior that will help. Hence we may dine
with a serene conscience. Neither are we able to tell after the fact, whether we
had killed a walrus. There will be no occasion for rue. This is our experience
with salad forks and walruses.
Now a physicist speaks up. It might be N. David Mermin; this theme is his
(Mermin [1990]). Every person, he says, will want to believe that their dinner
is a truly private affair. It will not satisfy that you will never know of all the
walruses you have saved and killed with your dining habits and that anyway
you could do nothing about it. The forks on the table and the walruses in a
distant sea have simply nothing to do with each other. Period! Any other idea
is madness.
Well, in fact, the forks and the walruses could have something to do with
each other in this way: they could be affected by a common cause. For example,
the sun rises and sets on both. If the walruses on one side of the earth tend to
die in the morning and a person on the other side tends to choose the shorter
fork in the evening, then forks and walruses will show a correlation. But even
so, if on an occasion you should happen to choose the longer rather than the
shorter fork, it will have no effect at all on the walruses. What will happen to
them will go on exactly the same way whatever you do with your forks. That
is the truth of the matter.
But the philosopher is keen. Sir, you have taken up an idea that is un-
empirical in its bones. It can not be tested. Once you have picked up a fork
there is no opportunity to rerun history to see what would have happened to
the walruses had you picked up the other fork.
3The physicist, however, is not convinced that this idea is unempirical.
Should not the theories that our experiences suggest be considered as empirical
as the raw experiences themselves? We have rooted ourselves in the principle
that what happens has physical causes, and we have fared excellently well. We
have found magma pools that cause volcanos to erupt and ribosomes that make
proteins.
Our theories say that causes are localized in time and space. If one thing
caused another thing at a distance, it is because something traveled between
them. Nothing relevant goes from fork to walrus, so the one does not affect the
other. Choice of a different fork will leave the walruses’ lives quite unchanged.
Our physical theories insist upon that very thing. This is clearly true of classical
physics. Quantum physics is still a bit of an enigma.
The philosopher is skeptical. Are we to be electrified that classical physics
consistently claims this, if there is just no way to check whether it is right in
its claim?
That set our physicist aback! Yet he came up with a riposte. The idea that
the walruses’ lives would have gone on the same if you had chosen a different
fork is not empty of content, he said. It has consequences. Let me show you
how.
It is possible to set up experiments in which from time to time two sub-
atomic particles fly out in opposite directions from a source. An instrument is
put in the path of each particle, and the instruments react. In each instrument
there may be, for example, a flash in one of several chambers. Call this, in-
tending vagueness, an observation. Each flight of particles ends in two events,
one on either side, and sometimes they are totally correlated with each other.
This is not astonishing. The two particles came from the same place.
Everything gets a name. An observation with an instrument of type A is
made on the particle flying out to the left. An observation of type J is made
on the right. Observation A can end in one of two kinds of event, a0 or a1.
J can end in j0 or j1. What is special is that the results a0 of A and j0 of J
always happen together. Naturally, a1 and j1 go together too.
Now we choose a variation of this experiment and propose how it might
turn out. There will be two kinds of observation that might be made to the left,
A and B. They cannot both be made on the same occasion; their instruments
will get in each other’s way. We must choose between them. To the right there
are also two separately possible observations, J and K.
Observation results might be correlated this way: If A and J are done,
then as before the events a0 and j0 always happen together. Write these paired
events as a0j0. So only a0j0 and a1j1 happen. If instead A and K are done,
only a0k0 and a1k1 happen. For B and J, we get just b0j0 and b1j1. But when
B and K work the shift, then b0 and k1 go together, and b1 with k0. In other
words, b0k0 and b1k1 never happen. Can this be?
4We shall reason about this. The experiment is made. ObservationsA and J
come out with a0 and j0. If we had chosen on this occasion to make the
observation B on the left instead of A, but had still observed with J on the
right, the observation on the right would have gone the same way and given
the same result that it did actually give, j0. What we choose to do on the left,
to put one or the other instrument in place, cannot change what happens on
the right, no more than choice of forks can change walruses’ lives. This is so,
even though both forks and walruses are affected by the sun, and both left and
right by the one source of particles.
Then our left-hand result would have been b0, had we chosen B, for we see
that j0 would still have happened, and b0 and j0 always go together.
By similar logic, if we had used K as our right-hand instrument, though
keeping A, we would have seen k0 happen. Finally, we reckon that this means
that if we had chosen differently at both places, observing with B andK instead
of with A and J, then b0 and k0 would have appeared.
Our hypothesis, that the events b0 and k0 can never happen together, has
become foul. What we hypothesized can not be. Observation results will never
be correlated in that particular way.
We have reasoned on the assumption that the same will happen on one side
whatever we may do on the other. So this assumption does tell us concrete
things about the world.
But perhaps it is another story if the instruments do not get in each other’s
way? We can see easily, without recourse to our assumption, that this snarl
of correlations is impossible should we observe with A, B, J, and K all at the
same time. Yet even when we can do all the observations at once, sometimes
we may not.
To handle that case, we may have a theory that observations A and B will
give the same result whether or not the other is also observed, and the same
with J and K. At first sight this seems enough to show that the correlations
are impossible even when we observe A, B, J, and K just in pairs. But it is
not enough. To show them impossible we still need that the results will go the
same way despite what instruments are put in place on the other side.
There are even stronger restrictions to be found on what can happen.
Hypothesized correlations, to get nixed, require no faultlessness. For example,
when we observe with instruments A and J, the paired results a0j0 or a1j1
might happen not always, but rather only 85% of the time. They still happen
preferentially, they are the favored pairs.
Now a0j1 or a1j0 happen 15% of the time. We can make the case more
definite, if we like, by letting a0 and a1 happen equally often, and the same
with j0 and j1.
Correlations of results of the other possible pairs of observations may be
reduced in the same way, left with right: A with K, B with J, and B with K.
5Then a0k0 or a1k1 will happen about 85% of the time; b0j0 or b1j1 the same;
b0k0 or b1k1 only 15% of the time.
We are going to make a long series of observations with the instruments
A and J. The experiment will run a million times. It is not impossible—
a million seconds is short of twelve days. This gives us a sequence of a million
results at A, call it A¨, and paired results at J, to be called J¨.
The percentages in these actual results cannot have strayed far from what
we expected to get. That the number of the favored pairs, a0j0 and a1j1,
will lie outside the range 84% to 86%, has about one chance in 10170 to hap-
pen. (1 in 100 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
000 000 000) We will ignore possibilities so little likely.
But we might have chosen to use, aport, instrument B instead of A. Would
the same starboard events still have happened? Perhaps it is not as clear to a
person that this would be true for an experiment of one million runs as it is
clear for one run. If it takes six months to do them, all sorts of things could
happen. Maybe an experimenter, after looking at the early results on the left,
walks over to the right and absent-mindedly spills tea on the instrument there.
Does this make any difference?
If you wish, unwanted effects can be starkly forfended. Place the observa-
tion stations a light year away from the source on either side. The particles
will travel to them at nearly the speed of light. Then during the whole course
of the experiment no influence can go all the way from one observation station
to the other, even if a year’s emission of particles from the source is needed.
So the sequence of results J¨ would still have happened. But what would
the results of B have been? When B was perfectly correlated with J we could
tell exactly. Now we can limit things only to possibilities. What might have
happened with B at the left station is any sequence of results that is consistent
with the sequence of results J¨ that did happen, and would still have happened,
at the right station. That is to say, where b0j0 or b1j1 occur about 85% of the
time, and b0j1 or b1j0 only about 15% of the time.
Give the name B̂ to this set of credible sequences of results, which consists
of those that would have been possible for B given what happened at J. The
set B̂ is not precisely defined, of course. But as long as B̂ does include all
sequences with a not utterly insignificant probability of happening in conjunc-
tion with J¨ , yet even so includes no sequences with percentages too far from
what is to be expected, the imprecision of its definition will cut no ice.
If we had changed the right side instrument rather than the left side one,
using K instead of J, there are certain sequences of results that K might have
given us. They are those that are consistent with the sequence A¨ we did get
on the left side. This set of possible sequences of results will be K̂.
6What, though, if we had chosen both a left side B and a right side K?
Something would have happened. And what would have happened is something
that can happen.
We have reckoned that the only possible sequences for the left, had we
chosen B and J, are those in B̂. And the only possible sequences for the right,
had we chosen A and K, are those in K̂. Now we reckon once again, this
time on the grounds that however we choose an instrument on one side, the
collection of those events that might possibly have happened on the other side,
had we chosen a different instrument there, must remain the same.
Accordingly, any pair of sequences that might have happened, had we
chosen both B and K, must have one sequence in B̂ and one in K̂. These pairs
of sequences, as a group, call B̂K. And let Q̂Q be those pairs of sequences
in B̂K that satisfy our special requirement. For we need, of course, that about
85% of the time the favored results b0k1 and b1k0 appear. Else a pair of
sequences cannot happen.
It is a simple mathematical consequence that Q̂Q is empty. Choose any
sequence B¨ from B̂ and any K¨ from K̂. We have four sequences now, A¨ and J¨
that happened, along with B¨ and K¨ that we picked. Because of the correlation
of B¨ with J¨, J¨ with A¨, and A¨ with K¨, at most about 45% of the time will b0 be
paired with k1 or b1 with k0. But 45% is far short of the 85% that B¨ and K¨
need to meet the special requirement.
Here is where the 45% comes from. To get b0k1 or b1k0 at some place in
the sequences, one must break the 0-with-0 and 1-with-1 pattern. A break will
come between two sequences, between B¨ and J¨, J¨ and A¨, or A¨ and K¨. For
when the pattern is unbroken we will have either b0j0a0k0, which gives b0k0,
or b1j1a1k1, which gives b1k1. An example with just one break, between
J¨ and A¨, is b0j0a1k1, which gives b0k1. There may be more than one break
appearing at the same place in the sequences, as with b1j0a1k0, which uses
three breaks to give b1k0, but this is wasteful. Because the breaks happen just
15% of the time in any one of the three pairs of sequences, we cannot have
more than 3× 15% of b0k1 and b1k0.
Q̂Q is empty. There is nothing that could possibly have happened had we
chosen B and K. Then our scheme with particles does not work. Not even if
favored results come with only 85% probability.
It seems likely that reasoning from the assumption that no matter what we
do some things will be completely unaffected and will happen the same way, is
something we do all the time, scarcely realizing it. If we knew more about it
we might reason this way more effectively.
There is just one more thing that Mermin mentioned. Quantum mechanics
is a well borne out theory, and according to it, the very state of affairs we have
been pondering can happen—by various observations of the spins of particles
fleeing in pairs in the singlet state, whose results will be correlated with the
7stated 85% probabilities. We can do experiments like that, though not yet so
nicely as we would desire.
Mermin is quite unsettled by this. The idea that to change our choice of
salad fork will make no difference whatever in the lives of arctic walruses, even
if both might be influenced by the sun, seems so fundamental to the nature of
our lives, is used by us so often and to such good effect, that one would think
that this idea could not ever lead us astray.
And how does it lead astray? You will find naught amiss when you break
bread. Rather, build sophisticated equipment and use it expertly. A ton of
results that look totally boring will then be yours. Only careful consideration
will reveal its fell oddness. Just in this arcane, hole-and-corner way does the
idea fail us. Even so, one would think—never.
2 Perfect and imperfect ideas
We like to think that there will be some characteristics of the universe for us
to find that are so basic that they abide exactly so. It has almost been the
definition of a philosopher to be a person who looks for those things. Physicists
are often given to doing this too. Yet I think the state of affairs described by
Mermin and retold here is substantial evidence, though of course not proof,
that the universe is so subtle that there are no ideas at all about it, no matter
how important, that are exactly true.
This belief or its opposite, that altogether true ideas do exist, are implicit
in virtually every discussion of the significance of quantum mechanics. No
doubt Schro¨dinger, for example, when he thought that wave functions describe
charge distributions, thought they did so accurately.
And I take the essence of Bohr’s complementarity to be just this: we must
make do with an assortment of imperfectly working ideas. He was brave to
think this, yet still too cautious. He tried to find form in this (the same form
as the simplectic classical physics has) by saying that the imperfect ideas occur
in pairs—complementarity. One or the other idea will be adequate to every
occasion. But Mermin’s example does not suggest anything like that.
Though one could think him fundamentally right, Bohr encrusted the
thought that there are no ideas to find that always work. Following gener-
ations might have dug it out again, but this is not the sort of thing physicists
like to do.
Philosophers have not shed light on this point either. Ontology should be
simply the science of existence. But philosophers have said that the important
thing is to find what exists, indeed, what really exists. What really exists is
comprehensible by ideas that are bang on the mark, of course. Thus the science
of existence is made to be based on the premise that there are fleckless ideas.
8The trouble here is not that some people are thinking along these lines, for
these people might still be right. It is that the underlying posit that some ideas
stand exquisitely true is not brought out. Many philosophers (and physicists
too) have taken the antithesis of the tenet that there are things that really
exist, to be the notion that the moon is not there when we do not look—rather
than the view that the idea of existence does not work to perfection.
The history of positivism has also bleared this point. Positivism placed its
bets on ideas close to experience and common sense. But the course of physics
has been contrary to that. Great daring has paid off. Especially since atoms
were seen, this has brought positivism into disrepute as a failure of nerve. Now,
that there are some perfectly true ideas at the bottom of the universe can be
felt to be a bold idea, and to find them to be our charge. In that case, to feel
there may be none would be a failure of nerve.
I can not say on oath that this would not be a failure of nerve. But ideas
that are not perfectly true need not be shallow. They can be deep.
Still, how can believing that there may be no perfectly true ideas help us?
Is this not just resignation? No, one has more freedom of thought.
Physicists often think in terms of ideas that they might conceive to be
wholly faithful. It could be just so that every pair of bodies attract each other
in proportion to their masses and inversely to the square of the distance between
them. Newton himself, to be sure, did not believe this to be the real truth.
But others became convinced that it was, and to search for the wholly faithful
ideas became science.
In quantum mechanics, the many worlds concept is an idea that if true will
be absolutely true. The entire universe will be precisely a wave function. The
same is true of the decoherence concept, at least as intended by its authors.
Wave functions are to be decohering through interaction with the environment
just as precisely as classical particles would be jiggled by their neighbors.
The taste for completely competent concepts has carried through from the
classical age right into the quantum age. More impacting on physics, though,
than the search by some scientists for the kind of idea that might be perfectly
true, is a common, thorough repugnance, among people of all kinds, for any
notion that might intimate that there are no such ideas to be found. Even
physicists who feel sure that we will never find these spotless ideas will share
the horror.
This antipathy has scrubbed the development of physics in important di-
rections. The remainder of this paper will explore avenues left to weeds.
93 Thought experiments
From my views on perfect and imperfect ideas it may appear that here is one
of those people who are fond of chiding the rigidity of those who like clarity
in thinking. This is not really so. If mathematics had been blessed with that
simple, clear form Hilbert hoped it would have, before Go¨del, I would have
been extremely contented. Indeed, when I first looked at quantum mechanics
I tried to find its meaning in ideas that would be perfectly true.
The form of quantum mechanics, with its spreading, entanglement, and
probabilities, suggests that wave functions represent information rather than
existents, as Heisenberg soon noticed. Taking quantum mechanics to be an
absolutely fundamental theory, I tried to think how it could represent informa-
tion perfectly. But whose information? Under what circumstances? To put it
honestly, even under the best of circumstances information is not quite solidly
defined. Always, someone may have slipped some loaded dice in on you. The
mismatch between information as we experience it and those precisely defined
mathematical wave functions is genuinely terrible.
Bohr, for his part, thought quantum mechanics fit to describe certain ex-
periments. They breed particles that fly through space and get detected. To
Bohr, this narrow duty is all that quantum mechanics handles in proper fashion.
That, naturally, raises the question of what special significance these experi-
ments can have to nature, what are we to learn from them, when they are the
sole legitimate object of nature’s most basic laws. Bohr never said. However
that may be, experiments cannot be picked out cleanly from the big sea of
events. But then, the wave functions appropriate to them cannot be a precise
truth.
If quantum mechanics is its lamp, then nature does not have the clear,
pure form that I had looked for. So what form does it have?
Quantum mechanics is most adroit at representing detection of radiation,
I believe. Scattering theory is not so much about collisions as about snaring
broadcast particles—this is what Born invented his probabilities for. This is
what Bohr’s favored experiments are, too. But catching radiation is only a
small part of the activities in the universe. Whatever does this mean?
The detection of radiation can define the lawfulness in nature’s behavior.
For we have found that if we wish to learn about a kind of thing, we can
find wave functions that typify it. By this artifice (a wave function will not
represent an actual example) we can calculate probabilities (also artifices) for
detecting sundry possible patterns of radiation. In a nutshell, from a thought
experiment we will find what that kind of thing typically looks like.
We learn from our experience. Sight is an ample part of that experience.
From these notional scenes we can infer, by empirical reasoning, how that kind
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But the empirical reasoning the thought experiments lead to cannot be
based only on the sights produced. Architectural likenesses between the wave
functions and what goes on in the world must also come into play. This, in-
escapably, is the basis for choosing a wave function that is typical of something.
To understand what these thought experiments are all about, it will be
meet to set out on an inquiry into how we do physics, or, better, into how we
make our way in this world with our ideas. Particularly, our most common
ideas need to be brought to the surface. We will start by looking at what
existence and logic mean to us and to classical physics. Then we will go into
what perplexes us about the thought experiments.
Some centuries ago the microscope first showed us germs. Control over
many diseases ensued. A meticulous knowledge of the structure of metals has
given us fine alloys. We learned to look for ever more detailed descriptions of
the things that exist. This serves us handsomely.
We have ideas about what exists that are not bad, and we are finding ever
better ideas. It is by our new ideas that we see why the old ones worked as
they did, for in some ways they came near to the new. Yet what happens when
we push this to the limit?
There would have to be perfect ideas of what exists at the end of the road,
resemblance to which, we should think, explains the success of our imperfect
ideas. We might take the exact descriptor of what exists to be classical me-
chanics, as an example.
What we will then need from classical mechanics is a theorem that in a
universe obeying its laws creatures that believe in classical mechanics and our
customary ideas (meaning, anyway, that they act as if they believe in them)
will prosper. Note that these creatures are little chunks of that universe.
But there can be no such theorem. A complex classical mechanical system
will behave in almost any way, following on the initial conditions, so long as it
avoids becoming simply chaotic.
Rather than to frame the existence of the entire universe, the genius of
classical mechanics must be to loosely match initial conditions to the various
situations we encounter, in fact to be used. Just as we use it.
We most naturally think of classical mechanics as being like a shallows of a
stream we have forded, something that is there that we have managed to bend
to our ends, but surely the reason it is there has nothing to do with that. To
the contrary, its utility is classical mechanics’ most salient characteristic. This
is quite remarkable, but, in truth, it is remarkable that any of our ideas are
the slightest use to us.
To our green eyes it seems like this: The sky is blue. That is why our idea
that the sky is blue works. But not really. Even if the sky is blue, this does
not at bottom tell why the idea of it helps us. (Mind the ‘no such theorem’
above.)
11
We may now draw these several conclusions. Classical mechanics can do its
duty only in a world fundamentally unclassical. If you take it with a childlike
total acceptance, classical mechanics will turn upon you and deny that belief
in itself ought to be useful, indeed just when that belief is utterly correct.
The concept of existence, on which classical mechanics is founded, we in-
stinctively take to be the gold standard, equivalent to truth. Yet it will be an
idea of grave moment that nevertheless, like all ideas, serves not quite thor-
oughly.
Truth is not the absolute guarantor of utility, though our consciences pro-
claim it. And we no more fathom why our ordinary ideas work than why wave
functions do, though we suppose we do.
Just as we tend to put too much weight on existence, so with logic. That
is the moral of the following tale.
Think about the classical laws of hydrodynamics and the ocean. These
laws will tell you how a fluid will evolve if you are given the motions of all
its parts at some instant. But though you may presume if you wish that the
dancing ocean is obeying the laws of hydrodynamics, still you cannot directly
use these laws to predict waves. There is no time when you can know the
motions of the water so well that you may precisely foretell the future. But
that is what true use of the hydrodynamic laws entails.
However, physicists will infer from the laws of hydrodynamics a serviceable
law of breakers. It tells how waves nearing on a gently sloping shore will break.
That does not follow from the laws of hydrodynamics by logic. It is not
like proving the Pythagorean theorem, given Euclid’s axioms. The inference is
made by inventing simple models that seem typical of seashores and playing
them out using the laws of hydrodynamics. Then you look for generalities in
the results, checking the generalities against experience to make sure you have
not got off the track.
If you go to the beach the law of breakers, unlike the laws of hydrodynamics,
will carry you happily, for you will know to expect breakers. But of course you
might run into a tsunami instead.
The laws of hydrodynamics, then, seem to play in the imagination. The
law of breakers is inferred from the laws of hydrodynamics, but not by means
that are totally logical. The law of breakers is practical, to be brought to bear,
not without fault, immediately on events.
Still, it is common to think of the practical laws as if they were theorems
that are logically derived from the axioms, the fundamental laws. Even when it
is recognized that in practice they are not proved as theorems, physicists tend
to think of the more special laws as nevertheless potentially logically derived.
If physicists get them otherwise, then it is because they take shortcuts, for
physics is difficult. Ah, but the practical laws are not derivable by logic.
12
Truly then, the methods by which physicists derive practical results from
principal laws are deep workings. They are not to be taken for granted, even
if it be that all our practical thinking is akin. These workings must be the
essence of the meaning of the principal laws.
Now for our disconcerting thought experiments.
A typical example of a steam engine will be, in our daily lives, an actual
steam engine that is like most steam engines in the ways we consider signifi-
cant. We judge that every steam engine can be rendered soundly by a classical
physical construct. To typify steam engines with the help of classical physics,
we need only choose one of its constructs that could describe an actual steam
engine, one that exists and is typical.
For use by the thought experiments, there ought also to be a wave function
that will typify steam engines. Wave functions, though, do not have the right
kind of structure to render existence soundly.
You know the difficulties. Wave functions spread and entangle, so the
properties of things are defined less and less sharply as time passes. They
give us probabilities that we have not been able to assign to the flow of events
in properly general fashion. Heisenberg and Bell have taught us that wave
functions have much the form of an incomplete knowledge of a physical system,
but without having that form exactly.
Wave functions are capable of great depth of definition, down to the quarks.
Can there really be devices so finely descriptive of what real things are like,
and yet not telling what real things are? It appears there can, however it be
that typicalness and existence become unexpectedly parted.
A switch engine steams up on the siding, and we are pretty sure what kind
of thing it is. But is it the same kind of thing as that mallet chuffing on the main
line? Well, it depends. In the same way, a particular wave function may be
typical of various kinds of things. Who knows which of its details will matter to
what concerns? Wave functions must cover all these subtle possibilities. This
is uncanny.
These thought experiments based on wave functions will seem eccentric.
They declare, “I was made to be a thought experiment. That is all I can be.”
We cannot say, however, that they must be incompetent, because not firmly
based on what exists. For, after all, we have no clue to why our common ideas
based on existence do work.
Yet perhaps our ordinary ideas and the thought experiments are, in the end,
similar and founded in the same way upon that fay creature, typicalness. Then
we should find the thought experiments to be less strange and our ordinary
ideas to be more strange than we ever imagined.
The thought experiments are an algorithm for finding practical laws out
of principal laws, by serendipity rather than by logic. The workhorses will
sometimes make use of wave functions just as the arabs do, and the distinction
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between practical and principal laws may not always be clear. It is true then
that this scheme is only loosely defined—it hangs after all on our powers of
empirical and mathematical thinking. We can never fully know what these
powers are capable of. Nonetheless the scheme does have design, enough to
make it promising.
Such a system could have been spotted as a possible way to understand
quantum mechanics around the time John von Neumann presented his mea-
surement theory—seventy years ago. There has never been a hint of it. It is
far from what physicists think physics is or ought to be.
4 The probabilities of physics
Probability has been a conundrum ever since it entered physics in the nine-
teenth century through the study of gases. Quantum mechanics allows the
computation of probabilities. If the events limned by quantum mechanics are
not real ones, whatever can its Born probabilities mean? There is no chance in
a quantum algorithm. It is calculation. One must draw conclusions from the
algorithmic scenes, but what gamble is there in that?
A quantum mechanical calculation from a wave function will give you a set
of possible observation results, each accompanied by its Born probability. In
your thinking to infer practical laws, of course you must take more seriously
those observation results with the higher probability. The Born probabilities
act as weights. But this is not yet satisfactory. Weight is too vague. How
seriously should you take an observation result with a weight of one fiftieth?
We need some real probabilities here. Here is how to get them. Fancy that
the whole set of possible observation results is not provided to you. Instead,
someone chooses just a few for you to see. The choice is made completely at
random. The probability of choosing each outcome is to be found by using its
Born probability made into a real probability by, say, rolling dice. But you get
only the several outcomes, without being told their odds.
See if you can figure out what laws you would most likely infer if this were
done. If you can do that, you are giving Born probabilities their right weight.
It is natural to use an assortment of wave functions to study some kind
of event. Not just one will be typical of it. To choose the assortment, you
are thrown on your judgment. This will dilute probability, but make it more
life-like. For events fill our lives, but their outcomes rarely happen with a
well-defined probability.
With a few kinds of event, then, even an assortment of wave functions, if
the wave functions are at all appropriate, will define fairly definite probabilities
for the several possible outcomes. With the rest of events, an assortment will
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be less coherent in its implications, showing us probabilities only in the more
nebulous sense of that word.
5 Measurement theory
The measurement theory that von Neumann blocks out in his Mathematische
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik of 1932 (von Neumann [1955]) lays bare the
mathematical backbone of observation algorithms. The theory is beautiful.
Nevertheless, two things von Neumann did wrong.
Sure, and times of measurement do not belong in his theory. They seem
gauche. By the precision of their definition they violate both the spirit of
quantum mechanics and the practice of scientists. And they are not modestly
a time at a place, they are a hypersurface bisecting space-time. If you consider
measuring a property of anything larger than a particle, these hypersurfaces will
portray a measurement of it that is nothing like a measurement any physicist
has ever made. The hypersurfaces are unreal.
They are also unnecessary. Born probability is defined without using times
of measurement. Both the wave function and the measurement result can be
evolved by the Hamiltonian, giving us two mathematical objects extending over
all time. The Born probability between them, defined in the usual way at one
time, is the same defined at any other time—so in fact it is timeless.
If these objects tendered over all time, the wave functions and measure-
ment results, are the natural basis of the theory—and its mathematics sug-
gests this strongly—then, despite all custom, this theory must not be a theory
of measurement. It must be something else. These objects have to do with
no particular time. But measurements, in general, will refer to a measured
property as possessed by a physical system at some moment.
There are, to be sure, some measurements that are not tied to a moment.
To find constants of motion is an example. Von Neumann’s theory without
times of measurement could describe that type of quantum measurement. Yet
these are only measurements by halves. They have only some of the properties
a good measurement should have.
Historically, Born found his probabilities in scattering theory. He made no
use of a time of measurement there. This concept is a later intrusion.
It appears in the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg representations. Each gives
you just one thing defined over all time, the wave function or the measurement
result. The other is given only at a certain instant. (Actually, in the Heisenberg
representation the evolution of the operator that stands for the variable to be
measured is presented. But the operator defines the possible measurement
results as eigenfunctions.) Here would be a wonderful project for a historian,
15
to discover why this was done. The idea of measurement of position may have
been central.
Quantum jumps, made into the ‘projection postulate’, are von Neumann’s
other lapse. Jumps are without doubt everything to the Bohr atom; they
played a vital role in the birth of quantum mechanics. Too, the maiden success
of Heisenberg’s new quantum theory was to define values for the ‘transition
probabilities’—the strengths of Bohr’s spectral lines.
But such saltations do not fit into the foundations of von Neumann’s theory.
Quantum jumps must be like the gushings of geysers, then. They can be
inferred from the theory, surely, but are not to be bolted right to its base.
Von Neumann left a record ([1955] pp. 212–14) of the origin in his mind of
the projection postulate. He tried to discover the significance of the celebrated
Compton-Simon experiment of 1925 and came to see it so:
Photons of known energy, coming from a known direction, strike electrons
at rest in a target. The incoming momenta of the two colliding particles are had,
then. The energy and direction of flight of both particles after the collision are
detected, so the outgoing momenta are found too. Any three of these momenta
settle the fourth—if conservation of momentum holds.
On this assumption, either of the measurements of the momentum of an
outgoing particle determines, in conjunction with the two known incoming
momenta, all aspects of the collision. In particular, the momentum transfer
between the two particles is fixed by this means (he considers the central line,
which is the direction of this transfer). The two determinations of the momen-
tum transfer did in fact agree, since this is just another way of saying that
momentum is conserved, which is what Compton and Simon found to be true.
The Compton-Simon experiment had famously shown the Bohr-Kramers-
Slater theory of 1924 to be wrong. By that theory momentum would be con-
served on average, but not in each individual collision. It was the quantum
mechanics of Heisenberg that conserved momentum precisely.
Von Neumann thought, though, that he had found an even deeper signifi-
cance in the Compton-Simon experiment than the conservation of momentum.
For he saw each detection of an outgoing particle momentum as a measurement
of the transfer of momentum. One of the two measurements is made a little
after the other, by “usually about 10−9 to 10−10 seconds” ([1955] p. 213). So
the lesson of the Compton-Simon experiment is that in the brave new world of
atoms a quick repeat of a measurement will get you the same number again.
He assessed on this basis the three rivals of the time, classical mechanics,
the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory, still quite fresh in mind, and Heisenberg’s
promising new quantum mechanics.
According to classical mechanics, the result of a measurement is determined
by the state of the system one is measuring. The state will not change quickly,
so if one measurement comes promptly after another, it must find the same
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value. But experiments showed that classical mechanics is wrong. And they
suggested that the results of measurements were not determined, were a matter
of chance. The two new theories presumed this.
If measurement results can be a matter of chance, it might or might not
be so that a closely following measurement will always arrive at the same
outcome. Von Neumann’s analysis of the Compton-Simon experiment tied this
to the conservation of momentum. By the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory, then,
the following measurement need not agree. By quantum mechanics, however,
the second measurement must give the same result as the first—despite that
the result of the first came only at random. This latter way in measurement,
he thought, is what nature has chosen—and with it quantum mechanics.
Then the course that has proven to be nature’s is more like classical me-
chanics than the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory envisioned. (But von Neumann
did not make this point, though others did.) Momentum is precisely conserved.
And a measurement done near after another will have the same issue. These
will be defining qualities of the new quantum physics.
For this reason von Neumann introduced his projection postulate ([1955]
pp. 214–23, 347–58, 417–21). A system quickly jumps into the eigenstate that
corresponds to the value the measurement found for the variable. (By the
accepted theory, a measured value will be an eigenvalue of the operator rep-
resenting the variable.) When more than one state corresponds to this value,
he said that the system will jump to one of them, but he could not say which
(pp. 218, 348–49). In this manner an immediate remeasurement of the variable
must come out the same way, in agreement with his analysis of the Compton-
Simon experiment (p. 335).
But von Neumann has been dreadfully careless. The measurement theory
he developed plumb invalidates his analysis of the Compton-Simon experiment.
His analysis says that the momentum transfer between the particles is mea-
sured. This is something whose value can be known only if you know at least one
of the two incoming momenta. (In fact, he assumes knowledge of both incom-
ing momenta.) In quantum mechanical terms, in order to find the momentum
transfer you require some knowledge of the incoming wave function. But by his
theory, you need not know anything about that wave function to know what
the measurement result is. Certainly momentum transfer has meaning, but it
is not a measurable quantum variable!
Moreover, what is more seriously wrong than its origin, von Neumann’s
projection postulate is utterly incompatible with the pith of his measurement
theory. Be a system given that interacts at various times with instruments,
whose dials are seen. His basic theory will insist on telling you what observa-
tions of the system this effects and what the probabilities of the results are.
There is just no room for further postulates in the matter.
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It is like this. The system and the instruments are combined into one wave
function. The observations will be of light coming from the dials. This light is
part of the wave function, too. The observations are also made into one. That
is to say, results of the light observations are deemed one combined result.
Formally, there is a single observation of a single wave function.
The way instruments touch the system may bespeak that by this means
the system is observed in several ways, at different times. But the algorithm
is simple; as it sees it, it makes precisely one observation (of light given off).
The algorithm allows no changes, lets no quantum jumps be put in.
The light observations do need to be, in a technical sense, compatible with
each other. Only then can they be made together and combined. It is easy to
find lots of compatible sightings of light. There is no problem here.
Von Neumann would say that these observations of the light scattered from
the dials are made simultaneously. This need not mean that they are made at
the same time. There is no need to assign times to them at all. Only the
information they gather concerns us, not when the information is acquired.
Would it please, dream the light is intercepted light-years away.
But if no projection acts, a wave function will evolve into a linear combi-
nation of live-cat-with-unbroken-flask-in-a-box and dead-cat-with-broken-flask-
in-a-box. This need not be a calamity in a thought experiment, however.
At the start the wave function should clearly typify a live cat and unde-
cayed atom. As time passes the sense of the wave function will become less
transparent to us, hinting at divergent possibilities. The information held in
the wave function at the start is less and less able to determine the situation.
Correspondingly, the congeries of possible sights produced by observation of the
wave function becomes more diverse. But each individual sight shows, within
the reach of its view, a particular case, such as a live cat or a dead one.
As often said, for cats in boxes entanglement probably has no practical
significance. It will act as if a mixture. But ‘practical significance’ is happier
in a thought experiment than in a definitive description of what exists!
So, were you to study Schro¨dinger’s cat by thought experiments, you will
find, I am sure, that the idea that an unseen cat is either dead or alive works.
Though not quite perfectly. Does a cat die just when its heart stops?
Musing that the cat is entangled will be possible too, but idle. The dead-
or-alive idea works better for us, and it is permitted. Yet there may be special
macroscopic circumstances that only a counterintuitive linear combination can
twig.
It is mordant. A young von Neumann is deeply impressed by a profound
discovery about measurement, found in his analysis of the Compton-Simon
experiment. He will not let go of it ([1955] pp. 351–58, 417–21). He mangles
his measurement theory to fit. There is no clearer, sadder example in the annals
of science of deciding beforehand and being stubborn. He killed his child.
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Pauli did not help. He put measurements into two classes, those that
conformed with von Neumann’s prescription and those that did not. Maybe
this was logical, but von Neumann’s quickly repeated measurement idea was
wrongheaded and fruitless, and it needed to be said.
Now it is time to tell about the good things in von Neumann’s theory. As a
start, a little essay I wrote will be dropped in place here. It will give a relaxed
and spacious look at the thought experiments.
6 Typicalness, radiation, and inference
Measurement is not the only way to garner physical information, photography
is another. But photography is physics’ orphan. A measurement gives direct
access to physical reality; a photograph means nothing until it is interpreted,
and that interpretation may involve subtleties of judgment that can never be
thoroughly understood.
So physics is deemed to be grounded on measurement—but its topic may
be photography. Quantum mechanics has a theory of photography that is
natural to the mathematics; its theory of measurement is still a worriment.
Quantum photography would be quite difficult to work with, its calculations
tough. On the other hand, the present theory of measurement, though easy to
use, appears to be an oversimplification.
6.1 Quantum measurement
We will look at measurement first. Classical physicists proposed that any
physical system always had accurately defined properties. These were quietly
thought to be, at least in principle, measurable at any time, so that nature
might be an open book.
In the quantum Schro¨dinger representation, a system is defined by a time-
dependent wave function. Call it an orbit . For any particular time, the orbit
yields the state of the system. But the state does not determine the value a
physical variable has, as in classical mechanics. If you measure, you might get
any of various results.
For physicists quickly forged an elementary theory of quantum measure-
ment. An operator represents a variable to be measured. The operator’s eigen-
values are the values of the variable that may be found. The eigenvector cor-
responding to a value gives, depending on the state of the system at the time,
the probability of obtaining that value in a measurement.
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The pioneers of quantum mechanics had found a simple analogy. The soul
of quantum mechanics will be that measurements of physical variables are to
quantum mechanics what physical variables are to classical mechanics. And
they gave the probabilities of the results of hypothetical measurements at any
precise time as sharp a definition as ever the variables of classical mechanics
had. The two theories were to be twins, if not in their meaning then in what
seemed even more important, the exactness of their delineation of what they
refer to.
But the potential measurements the pioneers posited are highly ideal, to
the point of being fantastic. In our world instruments make rough measure-
ments, and they will not work at all except on a limited range of systems. So
this original theory of measurement, although some of the ideas in it may be
important, is certainly not a definitive theory of measurement.
Yet if one improves the theory, making the measurements it outlines more
realistic, they become sloppier, not at all like the precise values at precise
times that variables have in classical mechanics. When measurement theory
gets better the pioneers’ parallel must break down glaringly.
They gave the idea of measurement too much honor. Too soon people did
not feel free to innocently explore and find what is there in quantum mechanics’
garden.
That serves as prologue to this story.
Von Neumann ([1955] chap. 6) elaborated the theory of measurement of the
pioneers by showing how a measuring instrument could be treated as a quantum
system interacting with the system to be measured. Since all measurements are
made by using instruments, measurement theory should then be what follows
from this development of the original theory. But there are changes to the
original theory. They are not modifications, they are revolutionary.
The first change: In von Neumann’s theory a measurement result is an
eigenvector, not an eigenvalue. By his analysis, what one can tell when an
instrument is used and its dial observed, is just the probability that various
dial readings will come about. Vectors define these probabilities. Eigenvalues
have nothing to do with it.
Vectors can be developed by the Hamiltonian into orbits. Then von Neu-
mann’s theory will have an orbit both for the system to be measured and for
the observation result. There is a resemblance to scattering theory.
No times of measurement have to be specified, because Born probabilities
are defined between two orbits without need to single out a time (or, it does
not matter what time you use). This is a relief, for the sharply defined times
of the original theory never suited the sense of quantum mechanics.
The second change: Vectors, or even density matrixes, as a rule are not able
to express the information gathered with the help of an instrument. A more
general mathematical form we may call co-orbits (they will be time-dependent)
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is needed. Born probabilities are now defined between an orbit and a co-orbit.
Co-orbits are like orbits, but can contain less information. In the extreme case,
no information is gathered by an observation at all.
The result is a theory of getting information from observations without
making measurements. For, typically, to observe by using an instrument cannot
even nearly be characterized as a measurement of a variable of the system
observed.
Also upset is the fundamental principle of classical physics, that physics is
all about the states of physical systems. Co-orbits are not orbits. The twain
can not both be states.
And we have only orbits and co-orbits, with no measurement reference
times. But this is not a tack new to physics. Born’s 1926 paper on scatter-
ing (Born [1983]) that introduced probability to the new quantum mechanics,
contains no times of measurement.
6.2 Quantum photography
Look at how the camera works. If a picture of a thing is to be taken, the
distance of the camera from this source of light is not critical. A camera at
a greater distance will capture essentially the same picture as would a closer
camera whose shutter was snapped slightly sooner. Taken alone, when the
shutter is snapped is then not acutely important either.
A camera may ‘measure’ that the position of a photon is at a certain grain
in the camera’s film at the instant the shutter is snapped. But this event is not
significant in itself.
To interpret the image in the photograph usefully, one must suppose the
photon originated at a distance from the lens and traveled freely through clear
space from the source. From the position of the developed grain one can then
get the direction the photon came from. Its orbit! The time of the snapping of
the shutter and the distance of the camera together determine the phase of the
photon (the timing of its motion, or how far ahead of or behind other photons
traveling the same path this photon is), which is also an aspect of its orbit.
The wavelength (color) of the photon might be found by the camera too, and
this too is part of the orbit.
Quantum mechanics is smoothly able to represent the kind of information
a camera gathers in, though not by photon orbits. Photon co-orbits are just
the thing. Remember, co-orbits are similar to orbits, except they can contain
less information.
A camera photographs radiation. The theory of the camera will then be
somewhat like scattering theory, for scattered particles radiate away from their
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collision. However, where scattering theory uses orbits both in and out, pho-
tography theory uses orbits in and co-orbits out.
Rather naturally, scattering theory has always been regarded as the study
of the transition of particles from the state they had before the collision to
the state they have afterward. Photography theory cannot be about such
transitions. The spaces of orbits and co-orbits are not alike.
By von Neumann’s theory subsystems with independent origins do not
interact with each other in the far past, nor are they entangled with each
other then. Rather similarly, co-orbits belonging to diverse, but compatible,
observations do not interact nor are entangled in the far future. They represent
elements of radiation that can be separately intercepted.
Radiation yields a bounty of co-orbits that do not interact in the future.
There can be a myriad of quantum observations of radiation that are all com-
patible with each other. Formally, such a myriad will be one combined obser-
vation.
Quantum photography is not the theory of the snapshot, it is cinematog-
raphy. Observation of radiation is not inherently static. In real life one can
take a movie easily . Its frames are very compatible observations.
The movie-like nature of quantum photography comes about like this. A
two-photon orbit may be composed from two one-photon orbits. Say that each
represents a photon traveling along a line, the two passing through a certain
point about a second apart. By a similar construction a two-photon co-orbit
can be formed from two one-photon co-orbits. The co-orbit can represent the
information obtained by a camera there, if it shot two frames a second apart
and each frame detected one photon.
But this co-orbit would need to show no information about photons be-
tween the two frames or outside the field of view of the camera, where the
orbit shows an absence of photons instead. This illustrates the necessity of the
greater mathematical generality of co-orbits.
Quantum photography will now provide us with pictorial histories of things
happening. It is natural that it should.
6.3 Imaginary experience
Do not seek the actual movies that quantum photography describes. Those
actual movies that would answer must be as rare and aloof as unicorns. Still,
quantum photography might tell us something sound about nature anyway.
For we are interested in seltzer water.
Observation of isolated systems tells us all we need to know about physics.
So we will make up a (real) freshly carbonated, isolated glass of seltzer. It
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might be enclosed in a glass sphere along with a lamp. We watch it. We
see bubbles forming, rising, and popping until the seltzer goes flat. We have
learned that seltzer fizzes. Can quantum photography match this?
We should be able to turn up a quantum orbit that typifies, especially at
some moment we choose, a glass of seltzer enclosed in a glass sphere with a
lamp. The glass sphere gives the seltzer an appropriate local environment (air
pressure, but we have overlooked gravity). The whole forms an isolated system,
and this is what orbits seem made to describe.
Wave functions spread and entangle. The orbit can represent a glass of
seltzer nicely only for a certain period. Then it will get muddy and muddier.
So our chosen time is when the orbit represents a glass of seltzer best.
There should be no light radiating away from the glass sphere at this special
time. Let the orbit produce its own radiation, as it will, lickety split. Light we
might put in then is our guess at what light the seltzer had emitted before the
special time—a guess at what the seltzer looked like in the past. In essence,
we will have conjectured how the seltzer had behaved. We ought not.
We need to find a suitable set of co-orbits too, one that is typical of the
set of all possible movies that some camera might take at some given position
and time with a certain number of frames, speed of the film, etc. This set
will be vast. Almost all of these movies will be just visual noise. Among the
comparatively few that are not will be every kind of informative movie you can
imagine, most all of them not about seltzer.
Now we combine this set of movie co-orbits with the seltzer orbit. Each
co-orbit will be given a probability by the orbit. Those with the greatest
probability (which will still be tiny for each) will show a glass of seltzer fizzing.
Quantum mechanics has just told us that seltzer fizzes.
6.4 Time reversal
Fizzing is irreversible, while the orbit evolves reversibly. Yet the two go to-
gether, because there is that special time. The orbit is, in important ways,
simple and unentangled then. It will contain no inherently informative radia-
tion. That kind of radiation is generated by Hamiltonian evolution, and it will
be entangled with the subsystem it emerged from. There can be unentangled
ambient radiation at the special time, but, just so that we may tell the story
readily, we will start the orbit off with no radiation.
After any time when there is no light, the orbit’s core (the glass sphere
with the seltzer) will radiate freely into space. And there will be no light in
space that might converge on the core later. But what happens before that
time?
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Look at the orbit time-reversed. The time of no light will have none still.
So the orbit going back will behave in the same general way. Now reverse the
orbit to forward again. In this way we see that, at all times before the time of
no light, the forward orbit contains light converging on the seltzer (and finely
entangled with it!). Nor can there be any radiating away, before.
The co-orbits will represent detection of light escaping from the seltzer,
but not detection of light converging on it. This is how a movie camera aimed
at seltzer behaves. Therefore the movies will be dark until that time when the
orbit has clearest definition, the special time, then show fizzing.
An orbit typical of a glass of seltzer, if time-reversed, will become an orbit
that is typical of a perhaps slightly different glass, as it happens. If typical
slight currents are rendered in the original, the reversed currents may not be
typical currents, but it will be near enough like a typical seltzer. So the reversed
orbit will fizz in its own way. (For clarity of reference, say that the reversed
orbit fitzes.) Of course, an orbit typical of some other kind of system might
change behavior dramatically when time-reversed.
The undetected converging light in the first half of the original orbit will
become the detected radiating light in the last half of the reversed orbit. This
light will make movie co-orbits depicting fitzing probable.
A quantum movie is not a movie that the reversed orbit produces and
then the movie run backward, like the way classical mechanics would have it.
For each movie is patterned by just half of an orbit, the half with outgoing
radiation.
The two half orbits handle a pair of cases that have precisely reversed
movement just as they start. A pair of classical motions that start thus can
be welded back to back into one continuous motion that has no beginning
and must be reversible. So too with the half orbits, but a quantum pair of
movies cannot be stitched together, and they will be depictions of irreversible
happenings.
6.5 Defining the behavior that is typical of nature
The full calculations of quantum photography are hopelessly hard. Finding
shortcuts and approximations will be very difficult. It is not clear what will be
possible for us. But something will.
If the calculations were easy we would learn marvelously about nature’s
behavior from our thought experiments. Yet they are incurably just thought
experiments. Real systems do not have a time when they are best defined;
figmental systems designed for quantum calculations must.
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Thought experiments will not tell us plainly what to expect. We are left to
infer, however we can, a variety of theories from the movies (fizzing of seltzer,
increase of entropy) that we may apply to our affairs, in the usual way with
practical ideas. These useful theories need not be classical. Some can make
use of quantum concepts, even wave functions.
We will make inferences from quantum sights as we do from the sights of
our genuine experience, with the twist that we have the help of our knowledge
of the mathematics that produces the movies. This is a strange new science.
But it is probably enough like our customary empirical habits of thought that
we can handle it.
Typicalness, radiation, and inference are the three timbers of imaginary
experience. For one, an orbit will not represent what exists. Even though an
orbit might contain all possible detail, we will choose an orbit to be typical
of a kind of thing. Orbits are explicitly good for naught else. Next, we learn
of typical behavior through the informing capacity of radiation. Finally, the
content of the orbits and the sights painted by the co-orbits are expressly
a riddle. We must draw on all our cleverness to get out meaning from them.
None of this were we expecting to find in the rock bottom laws of nature
Indeed, no one would have dreamt that nature’s typical local behavior
might be defined this way. It may be nature’s way, all the same; it need only be
effective at defining her typical behavior. Nature does not even have to permit
us to fully ferret out why her way of defining her passel of orderliness works.
Note that ruefully but well.
Whatever our misgivings, quantum photography does nevertheless sketch
what nature may do. Let there be a more fundamental way in which quantum
mechanics defines nature’s local behavior, if you will. It is constrained to agree
with whatever quantum photography may tell us.
But I do not see how quantum photography, without some advance, can
give us cosmological results. We do have cosmological results, and here it might
be that quantum photography does not plumb quantum mechanics’ depths
(still, I believe it does).
[A comment on this point: Lay out a flat, classical space. In the center will
sit a quantum system which emits radiation. Now modify this, I do not know
how, so that the quantum system sits in quantized space but still sends its
radiation out into a classical-like space. Then invert the construction. A quan-
tum system in quantized space surrounds a patch of classical space into which
it spews radiation, which is observed.
The universe as a whole might be studied by thought experiments of this
apt form. In the classical patch of space picture astronomers looking out at and
discovering the quantized universe. The place where they dwell is not treated
like the rest of the universe, but this is not fatal. The vignette is only to be a
thought experiment, not a mirror of reality.]
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7 Von Neumann’s theory grounded on observation of radiation
I would like to show in more detail how von Neumann’s theory supports the
thought experiments. The ideas that will be brought forward ought to be based
on clear mathematics, and I do not have that. These are guesses, but good
guesses, I think. They anticipate the morphology of the theory when it is
properly developed.
By his projection postulate von Neumann tried to mimic an ideal of clas-
sical physics, the measurement that does not disturb. The classical property
that is measured is not changed. A quickly following measurement will then
get the same result. He could echo only the latter trait, and that not gracefully.
But quantum mechanics actually has an ideal both more realistic and more
perfect. When we catch the radiation that is freely given off by a quantum
system, sent out into space never to return, we learn something of that beaming
system without disturbing it at all. Naturally, though, we will have disturbed
the radiation we catch. This will not concern us the least bit.
We can con a thing, too, by putting instruments onto it. These may disturb
the object. But the information they gather will be sent away in radiation. We
observe this radiation without disturbing the object and instruments.
In sum, a magnificent way to learn of all things without bothering them
is to monitor their radiation. Among these things are observations themselves,
both disturbing and undisturbing ones. These observations to be studied may
be fashioned by installing their instruments, and the instruments might observe
radiation, as we do too, or be more meddling.
For these reasons, the algorithms that express von Neumann’s theory will
firstly sense radiation, and all will hinge on these primary observations.
7.1 Basics
A physical system may be made up of two or more systems that began apart.
To show this, in the distant past the orbit of the group is (at least very nearly)
a tensor product of orbits. Each alone would represent a component system
when alone. Later these orbits may be interact and entangle.
Not every set of orbits for individual systems can be combined in this way.
For example, there may be two orbits that if put together by tensor product at
any one time whatever, would interact and entangle at once. When two orbits
can be combined, we will say they are past distinct . Orbits p and q combined
are represented by a commutative and associative product called p× q.
This is not itself a tensor product. The orbit has the tensor product form
only in early times. This product is more physics than mathematics, not always
defined, and when defined, a little rough-hewn.
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An observation may be effected by separately observing several things.
Were a contributory observation made alone, the information come by would
be represented by a certain co-orbit. The several things observed must be
separately accessible, so these several co-orbits will not be interacting in late
times. The result of the combined observation, then, is that co-orbit with
the form, throughout the future, of the tensor product of those contributory
co-orbits. They need not remain unentangled toward the past. If co-orbits
S and T are future distinct , they combine into the product S |×| T .
The probability that an observation of a system will have a certain result
is determined by the orbit of the system and the co-orbit of the result alone.
That is to say, it is not influenced by the method of observation, nor by what
other possible results the observation may have. The Born probability between
an orbit p and co-orbit S is (pS ) .
The co-orbits will be gathered into sets named bindles . A bindle represents
all the possible results of an observation. For any orbit p, the sum of the Born
probabilities (pS ) , for all the co-orbits S in a bindle {Si}, will be one. The
co-orbits in a bindle need not be future distinct from each other. They can
even be identical. (Two separate possible results of an observation, which is to
say two distinct kinds of event, might yield the same information. A co-orbit
represents information.)
Two bindles will be consonant if they represent the possible results of two
observations that may be done together without interfering at all with each
other . We will see what that means shortly. Each co-orbit in one bindle will
be future distinct from each co-orbit in the other. It follows, of course, that
two co-orbits, one from each of the consonant bindles, may be combined by the
product |×|.
But |×| can only be used to combine co-orbits of observations that do not
interfere with each other. At least, the observations must not interfere with
each other in the circumstance that they come out with the particular results
that are to be combined. This is a milder condition than that they never
interfere with each other.
It is easy enough to see why use of |×| must be limited in this way. When
two observations are made of a system p, the Born probability for the results
S and T to happen together, if it can be expressed in the form (p(S |×| T )) ,
depends only on p, S, and T . That is not enough information to tell the prob-
ability that S and T will happen together if either observation of p interferes
with the other when these results occur. The interference could take many
forms, after all. But if they do not interfere with each other, there can be
only one probability for the joint occurrence of their results S and T , when
observing p. The role of (p(S |×| T )) is to say what it is.
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7.2 Primitive observations
We will build a set of bindles, designed to represent some observations of the
radiation that springs from a central place. These are the primitive bindles ;
they found the algorithm. A primitive observation consists of its primitive
bindle alone. The other observations, which all have their own bindles, are
constructed from primitive bindles and instruments.
Just for sake of simplicity, we will choose the primitive bindles to be all
consonant with one another. A bindle cannot be consonant with itself, however.
In this theory, the same observation cannot be made twice.
The Born probabilities of the primitive observations will satisfy this law:
0) (pS ) =
∑
j (p(S |×| Tj)) for all orbits p considered,
where S is a co-orbit of one primitive observation and {Tj} is the bindle of
another. This says that when observing any orbit p, the observation {Tj} does
not disturb the observation {Si} when the result of the latter is S.
For (pS ) is taken to mean the probability—when no other observation is
made—that the observation {Si} will bring forth the result S. By similar logic,
(p(S |×| T )) is the probability that the two observations {Si} and {Tj} will
have the results S and T together, these two observations alone being made. It
follows that
∑
j (p(S |×| Tj)) will be the probability of S when there are just
the two observations and the result of {Tj} is unknown. Equation (0) says that
this is the same as the probability of S when there is only the one observation.
This is the definitive criterion of innocence that one observation does not
interfere with another. Primitive bindles always meet it. Hence (pS ) comes
to mean the probability of S regardless of whether other primitive observations
of radiation are done too, if their results are unknown.
7.3 The two division operations
Besides the two ‘multiplications’, × and |×|, there are two ‘divisions’. The first
division tells how the information provided by the outcome of one observation
changes the probabilities of the potential results of any other observations that
are made along with it. We mean, here, that several observations must be
mutually noninterfering if you can say they are made together, else you only
tried to make them together.
The other division represents information about a system, when got by way
of a primitive observation aided by an instrument. The instrument is a second
system that comes into being away from the first, then interacts with it.
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People have used this latter division to express the information that is in
a measurement result. To get a result, they apply a measuring instrument to
the examinee and then observe the instrument’s dial.
The division is actually broader in scope. For example, the observation
that sees the dial might see more, it might catch direct sight of the examinee.
And it even might not see the instrument, which has no dial. This says it
best: the primitive observation will win information about the examinee, and
the instrument has an influence on this. The instrument need not be the sole
agency for the investigation.
Neither of these divisions is new. They are implemented mathematically by
partial traces. See Karl Kraus’s States, Effects, and Operations (Kraus [1983]).
But they will be treated here in an uncommon manner.
The first division. We have two primitive (and so mutually noninterfering)
observations of a system whose orbit is p. There is a certain probability that
the second observation will come to a result whose co-orbit is T when the first
has resulted in S. This conditional probability is the prior probability that
both will happen, which is (p(S |×| T )) , divided by the prior probability that
S will happen, which is (pS ) .
We will define a new orbit which will yield all these new probabilities
that are conditioned on the occurrence of S. It will be the orbit q for which
(qT ) = (p(S |×| T )) / (pS ) , to hold for all the co-orbits T in the bindles
of primitive observations that are consonant with the primitive observation
whose result is S. These will be all the primitive observations other than the
one whose result is S—given our choice of a simple set of primitives.
However, probability theorems are neater when a probability distribution
is normalized, not to one, but to the probability that the circumstance will
happen that makes the distribution germane. Then every probability given by
the distribution will be the joint probability that this circumstance, and the
event the probability is linked to within the distribution, both happen.
A probability distribution normalized to one shows, instead, conditional
probabilities that events will happen. The condition, of course, is that the
state of affairs that the distribution is designed to deal with has come about.
The same is true for orbits. They, too, skip more nimbly if the probability
distributions they define are normalized to the probability that the event that
makes an orbit the right one will happen. It does take getting used to. One
is accustomed to thinking in terms of conditional probabilities, which frankly
posit that a significant event has occurred and go on from there.
Our orbit q becomes apt when S happens, for q gives probabilities that
are predicated on that event. The probability of S is (pS ) . We want the
probability distributions that bindles create to be normalized to this. So we
will multiply q by (pS ) to give us r—if an orbit q is multiplied by a constant a
29
to form the orbit aq, it means that ((aq)T ) = a (qT ) for all the relevant
co-orbits T . Real numbers between zero and one, like a here, I call bambinos .
We will say that (pS ) is the norm of this orbit r. In symbols, ‖r‖. So
‖r‖ = (pS ) , r = ‖r‖q, 1 =
∑
j (qTj ) ,
(qT ) = (p(S |×| T )) / (pS ) .
Therefore, for any bindle {Tj} consonant with {Si}, ‖r‖ =
∑
j (rTj ) .
For T s in these bindles, (rT ) = (p(S |×| T )) . The orbit r gives, with a T ,
the joint probability that S and T result when p is observed.
An orbit now has, in its norm, an extra item of information, the probability
of the event that makes the orbit pertinent. Just by dividing a new style
orbit (like r) by its norm, an old style orbit (like q) is recovered. It provides
probabilities based on the premise that this event has happened.
The division p /| S shall mean r. Then ((p /| S )T ) = (p(S |×| T )) for
all the T s in bindles consonant with {Si}. And ‖p /| S‖ = (pS ) .
Orbit norm with division /| can express Born probabilities, as just shown.
Then we may use the rewritten equation ‖p /| (S |×| T )‖ = ‖(p /| S ) /| T ‖, if
we wish. Its sides were switched for easier comparison with later equations.
The second division. If we want to learn about a physical system, it may
help to look after it has interacted with another system. One system may be
represented by the orbit p when it is alone, the other by q. They should have
arisen independently of each other, so the two together will be p× q.
A primitive observation is made of the whole. The probability of getting
the result S is ((p×q)S ) . The co-orbit S represents information gained about
system and instrument. No prior knowledge is supposed of either.
When the instrument is known (its orbit in the far past is q) and the primi-
tive observation of the system and instrument has a result, we gain information
about the system. This information will be expressed by a co-orbit U. It will
form a Born probability with the system’s orbit.
Mark that we look for a co-orbit U to express the information, rather
than, say, for the value of a variable. It is a peculiarity of quantum mechanics
that the information contained in an observation result takes the form of the
specification of the probability of getting the result, for any possible orbit of a
system observed. This is what co-orbits provide.
What is telling, a co-orbit thereby sets new probabilities, for the potential
results of other observations, that are conditioned on the result it represents.
The product |×| is important to this end, since it helps to define the joint
probabilities of results of mutually noninterfering observations.
The co-orbit U we seek, and the primitive observation result S, are two
aspects of the same event and must have the same probability of coming up.
Thus (pU ) = ((p× q)S ) . Since U depends on q and S, let S / q mean U.
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Then (p(S / q)) = ((p× q)S ) , for all the ps that have a genesis unlinked
with q. Here we may say, if we wish, that ‖(p× q) /| S‖ = ‖p /| (S / q)‖.
The whole bindle {Si} of the primitive observation (which observes instru-
ment and examinee) is changed, by the instrument whose orbit is known to
be q, into a new bindle {Si / q}. This is for a different observation (it observes
the examinee) that is not primitive. It is an instrumented observation. The
instrument , q, and the look , {Si}, fashion it.
The norm of q may not be one. The definition of S / q then gives us that
(p(S / q)) = ((p× q)S ) = ‖q‖ ((p× q )S ) , for orbits p independent of q.
The symbol q means q normalized to one; in other words, q equals ‖q‖ times q.
The law p× aq = a(p× q) was used. This S / q defines joint probabilities.
They are for the happening of the event that makes the orbit q represent the
instrument, together with the observation result that S / q represents.
We said, when introducing the concept of bindle, that if {Si} is a bindle
then
∑
i (pSi) = 1, for any orbit p (of norm one). This no longer need be
true, since co-orbits have been generalized. For example, for the bindle {Si / q}
we have
∑
i (p(Si / q)) =
∑
i ((p× q)Si ) = ‖q‖
∑
i ((p× q )Si ) = ‖q‖.
So now the sum may be any bambino. This will be the bindle {Si}’s norm.
In symbols, ‖{Si}‖ =
∑
i (pSi ) for any relevant p of norm one.
A co-orbit S should be seen as a part of the bindle it is in. One can nor-
malize the co-orbit by multiplying it by the reciprocal of the norm of its bindle.
(When a co-orbit is multiplied by a constant a, then (p(aS)) = a (pS ) for
all relevant orbits p.) A normalized co-orbit, S , gives the right probability for
a result when events have made its bindle the right one. Naturally, the norm
of a bindle of normalized co-orbits is one.
When we equated
∑
i (p(Si / q)) to ‖q‖ above, we assumed that the
norms of p and {Si} are one. One will often want to take some orbits and
bindles for granted: the conditions for their use hold, and their norms are one.
These orbits and bindles are pegged .
The orbits p /| S and co-orbits S / p have been defined in terms of the
Born probabilities they define. They have been given no other form, and no
Hamiltonian evolution. That they need to have in a complete theory, in order
that the two multiplications may be defined for them, and not least to hint
to us what these orbits and co-orbits might mean as representatives, in some
fashion, of physical things.
7.4 Four equations
The two divisions have been termed divisions in order to draw on analogies
with arithmetic. Here are four equations that look arithmetical.
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1) p /| (S |×| T ) = (p /| S ) /| T
Two primitive observations of an examinee have been made. Their results
are now to be taken into account. This equation states that the new proba-
bilities based on this information, for the possible results of a third primitive
observation, can be calculated equally well in either of two ways. You may
combine the two observation results into one and so take them into account
together, getting the orbit p /| (S |×| T ). Or you may take them one at a time,
getting first the orbit p /| S and from that the orbit (p /| S ) /| T . You can then
calculate the Born probability (given that S and T happened) of a result of
a third observation, by using its co-orbit and either of these two equal orbits
normalized.
The norms of the two orbits in equation (1) did not help to define the
probability of a result of a third observation. But the equation does say the
norms are equal, and this has its own meaning. The equal norms imply that
there are two ways to calculate the probability that the results S and T will
happen together. You may find the probability of the two combined. Or you
may figure the probability of one result and multiply that by the probability
that the other will happen, given that the first did. In formulas, (p(S |×| T ))
equals (pS ) (this is ‖p /| S‖, remember) times ((p /| S )T ) .
2) S / (p× q) = (S / p) / q
Two instruments can work with a primitive observation to make an in-
strumented one. The instruments can be introduced en bloc or one at a time.
In the first method, the two are simply combined into one instrument. In the
second method, we use the instrument p with the primitive bindle {Si} to make
an intermediary instrumented observation whose bindle is {Si / p}. The ex-
aminee of this observation is the second instrument, q, and the system we are
interested in looking at, taken together. Then we can use q as the instrument,
and the bindle of the intermediary instrumented observation as the look, to
make the ultimate instrumented observation.
7.4.1 When instrumented observations do not interfere
Equality of the norms of the orbits on either side of equation (3) below says
that the probability of a result of the look observation is the same as the
probability of the corresponding result of the instrumented observation, or
((p × q)S ) = (p(S / q)) . That is always true. Not so for equality of the
two orbits themselves. This is, rather, a condition of especial interest.
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3) (p× q) /| S = p /| (S / q)
Envisage a space x of orbits within which the orbit p of a system to be
observed must lie. There will be two observations of this examinee. One is in-
strumented, composed of its instrument q and its look, a primitive bindle {Si}.
The instrument hatches apart from the whole examinee space. And there is,
too, a primitive observation, with bindle {Tj}.
The primitive observation will never interfere with the instrumented one.
It will not foil that other primitive observation, the look of the instrumented
observation, nor push instrument or examinee around.
But under what circumstances will the instrumented observation not inter-
fere with the primitive one? Suppose the instrumented observation is made, its
look results in S, and this is minded. The probability of a result T of the prim-
itive observation may then differ from what it would have been if the primitive
observation had been made by itself.
It seems reasonable to think that the primitive observation has not been
interfered with (when T turns out to be its result) if this is so: That change in
the probability of T depended only on the information about the examinee that
the instrumented observation supplied—namely, the observation’s result S / q.
(That is to say, the change did not depend on the means of the instrumented
observation—its instrument q or look {Si}.) Call this yardstick the criterion
of the import of the observation result by itself for noninterference by an in-
strumented observation.
If the criterion of import is not satisfied, then the presence of the instru-
ment must have affected the chances of the primitive observation’s result. The
primitive observation might have seen the instrument. Or it could have seen
something in the examinee that was changed by the examinee’s interaction with
the instrument.
The criterion of import is satisfied, when the instrumented observation
results in S / q and the primitive observation in T , if the observations comply
with the following condition:
3a) ((p × q)(S |×| T )) = ([(p× q) /| S ]T ) = ([ p /| (S / q)]T ) =
( p [(S / q) |×| T ]) for all p in x.
Be sure to spot that the orbit p /| (S / q) when paired with the co-orbit T
to form a Born probability, yields the joint probability of S and T , not the con-
ditional probability of T given S. To get the conditional probability one must
divide by the norm of p /| (S / q). Its norm is ‖p /| (S / q)‖ = (p(S / q)) =
((p× q)S ) , the probability of S.
The extreme right-hand side of equation (3a) can rightly use |×| because
here the instrumented observation’s result S / q satisfies the criterion of im-
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port with respect to the primitive observation’s result T . So p, T , and S / q
do supply all the information necessary to determine the Born probability.
There is a second plausible idea for when an instrumented observation does
not interfere with a primitive one. It is that the mere presence of the instrument
will not affect the probability of a result of the primitive observation. The result
of the instrumented observation is ignored here.
The criterion of transparency of the instrument to the other observation is
its name. This expresses it, when the primitive observation results in T :
3b) ((p× q)T ) = (pT ) for all p in x (q is pegged).
Here is a sketch of a proof that meeting the criterion of import for every
result of an instrumented observation, plus meeting the criterion of innocence,
implies satisfaction of the criterion of transparency. This sequence of transfor-
mations shows that ((p× q)T ) equals (pT ) , for all p in x:
a) ((p× q)T )
b)
∑
i ((p× q)(Si |×| T ))
c)
∑
i ([(p× q) /| Si ]T )
d)
∑
i ([ p /| (Si / q)]T )
e)
∑
i (p [(Si / q) |×| T ])
f ) (pT )
We go from (a) to (b) because the criterion of innocence holds between
primitive bindles. From (b) to (e) when p and q, all the results Si of the
look, and the result T satisfy equation (3a). And from (e) to (f ) when the
instrumented observation satisfies the criterion of innocence with respect to
the primitive result T . This step expects, too, that the norm of q is one.
7.4.2 When observations are subsidiary to instrumented ones
We will retain, for the purpose of understanding equation (4) below, the space x
for the orbits of examinees, the instrumented observation with instrument q and
look {Si}, and the primitive observation with bindle {Tj}.
4) (S |×| T ) / q = S / (q /| T )
The result of a primitive observation is subsidiary to an instrumented ob-
34
servation if, when you do not know the result of the look of the instrumented
observation, the primitive observation has provided no information about the
space of orbits that the instrumented observation is observing. A subsidiary
observational result may nevertheless be helpful when you do know the result
of the instrumented observation’s look.
Heeding the subsidiary observation may modify the probabilities of the
results of the instrumented observation. Since the subsidiary result says nothing
about the examinee, it seems plausible that it must say something about the
instrument. Then the whole impact on the instrumented observation ought to
be effected by a change of the orbit of its instrument. When this can be done
the criterion of bearing through the instrument alone is met—a touchstone for
subsidiary observational results.
If the primitive observation had seen into the space x, then surely its
result would have held too much information for this maneuver to work. The
observation could peek into the space to be examined by seeing an examinee, or
just by seeing the instrument too late, after the instrument had interacted with
an examinee—or even merely had had a chance to interact with an examinee
had one been there.
The criterion of bearing is satisfied, should the primitive observation result
in T and the look of the instrumented observation in S, when the following
condition is in force:
4a) ((p× q)(S |×| T )) = (p [(S |×| T ) / q ]) = (p [ S / (q /| T )]) =
([p× (q /| T )]S ) for all p in x.
The Born probability that S / (q /| T ) and p define is the joint probability
for S and T to happen. It is not the conditional probability of S given T .
Whether or not {Tj} is subsidiary, taking the occurrence of T into con-
sideration will modify the instrumented observation into something like a new
observation. The ‘bindle’ of this new ‘observation’ is {(Si |×| T ) / q}.
But,
∑
i (p
′ [(Si |×| T ) / q ]) =
∑
i ((p
′× q)(Si |×| T )) = ((p
′× q)T ) ,
if p′ is any orbit of norm one in the space x. Thus in the general case, the ‘norm’
of this ‘bindle’ depends on which orbit p′ is used to define it. An observation,
however, really should not presuppose that we know the examinee’s orbit. It
has to count on the orbit’s lying within a certain space x, though.
If we do have a proper observation, then its norm will be ((p × q)T ) ,
the probability of T . When S / (q /| T ), which we are taking to be equal
to (S |×| T ) / q here, is normalized in this way, it and p together give the
probability of S given T .
The extreme right-hand side of equation (4a) implies that use of the mul-
tiplication × is justified. This is to say that p and q /| T were solitary in the
past, just as p and q were. But this is a matter I have given little thought to.
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Here is another idea for when a primitive observation is subsidiary to an
instrumented one. Only the instrument and whatever is in the space x are
present, and the probability of the result of the primitive observation does not
depend on what is in x. Then the criterion of total invisibility of the space of
examinees to the primitive observation is fulfilled. (The primitive observation
cannot see into the space x, not even with the help of the instrument.) It is
expressed thus, when the result of the primitive observation is T :
4b) ((p× q)T ) = (qT ) for all p in x (the ps are pegged).
This is a sketch of an argument, for each p in x, that satisfaction of the
criterion of bearing with respect to every possible result of the look implies
satisfaction of the criterion of total invisibility:
a′) ((p× q)T )
b′)
∑
i ((p × q)(Si |×| T ))
c′)
∑
i (p [(Si |×| T ) / q ])
d′)
∑
i (p [ Si / (q /| T ) ])
e′)
∑
i ([ p× (q /| T ) ]Si )
f ′) (qT )
We go from (a′) to (b′) because the criterion of innocence holds between
primitive bindles. From (b′) to (e′) when p and q, all the results Si of the look,
and the result T satisfy equation (4a). And from (e′) to (f ′) because the norm
of p is one and the norm of q /| T is (qT ) .
Equation (3a), if we wish, is ‖(p× q) /| (S |×| T )‖ = ‖p /| [(S / q) |×| T ]‖.
Equation (4a) can be put so: ‖(p× q) /| (S |×| T )‖ = ‖ [ p× (q /| T )] /| S ‖.
In this survey the scope of the definitions and equations has been in sev-
eral ways unnecessarily limited to primitive observations. This was done out
of conservatism. Primitive observations are simpler than instrumented ones.
I stuck my toe in just far enough to test the water.
There are important structural departures from von Neumann’s theory in
the theory outlined here. Here orbits and co-orbits have restricted domains.
(Those co-orbits for which an orbit may offer a Born probability are its domain.
The domains of co-orbits are analogous.) For example, orbits of the form p /| S
may act only with co-orbits from the bindles of observations that are mutually
noninterfering with the observation that produced the result S. There will be
reasons for even narrower domains.
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Another departure: The light that radiates away from the source in a
certain solid angle (and there may be no light there) is a typical subsystem
that a primitive observation might observe. Or, for a better example, take the
incoming light in the field of view of a camera. This is quite different from a
subsystem in von Neumann’s sense. Identical particles need to be handled, too.
A new kind of tensor product is needed for the orbits and co-orbits. Actually,
the observations should be implemented with quantum field theory.
8 Conclusion
There is no way to know what treasures may lie in the thought experiments
until they are explored. But they do hold promise to unveil the precarious
affiliation between the make-up of the orbits and the make-up of reality. This
is what I mean:
Orbits that might typify a snippet of existence, are the slightest part of
the ocean of chaotic nonsense that the set of all orbits represents. There is
a problem of fishing for those efficacious orbits, then. The division /| could
help here by a process of annealing. For example, we might choose an orbit
that is not very ‘real’ because the objects it represents are not much localized.
After some observations are made, an orbit expressing the results of these
observations may represent the objects as better localized. This would be
imperfectly done, of course, because only what can be seen would be bettered.
But it would be a hint at what a ‘real’ orbit should be like. And orbits might
be improved in other ways by observation. Certainly, a linear combination of a
dog and a cat would be resolved. Maybe one could show that thermodynamic
states should be Gibbsian ensembles.
There is something ineffable about the real, something occasionally
described as mysterious and awe-inspiring; the property alluded to is
no doubt its ultimacy, its spontaneity, its failure to present itself as
the perfect and articulate consequence of rational thought. On the
other hand mathematics, and especially geometry, have exactly those
attributes of internal order, the elements of predictability, which re-
ality seems to lack. How do these incongruous counterparts of our
experience get together?
Henry Margenau ([1949])
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Addendum
The thought experiments can in principle solve the problem classical mechanics
could not, namely to show that belief in themselves is useful.
For you can do the following: Make up a wave function typical of an
astronomical gas cloud. Then find movies made probable by the wave function
that show a solar system forming. Look for the development of life and of
intelligent creatures on a planet. By observation learn their language and so
their thoughts. See if they have conceived of quantum thought experiments
and whether this seems to help them flourish.
Of course you cannot really do this. And any sort of try at a shortcut
would meet formidable difficulties.
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